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Restroom Use, Civil Rights, and Free Speech
"Opportunism"
TIMOTHY ZICK*

Commentators have expressed concerns that litigants are invoking the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause strategically, in order to
compensate for the weakness or futility of other constitutional claims.
The phenomenon has been given a label-" opportunism "-and
scholars have examined some of its causes and consequences. This
Article takes a closer and somewhat skeptical look at the concept offree
speech "opportunism." It imagines that the Free Speech Clause will be
invoked in challenges to laws or policies that restrict public restroom
use based on a person's gender. Would such challenges be
"opportunistic, " as the term has been defined? What would such claims
tell us about the causes and consequences of invoking the Free Speech
Clause, particularly in situations where it appears to be a second-best
claim? Drawing lessons from the restroom example, as well as the
broader civil rights free speech tradition, the Article argues for greater
precision and caution when affixing the "opportunism" label. It also
contends that while strategic free speech claims could produce certain
costs, they might also produce some underappreciated benefits.
Ultimately, the Article suggests that criticisms ofparticular litigants or
claims seem misdirected The real concern appears to be the substance
of free speech doctrines and theories. These facilitate free speech
entrepreneurism, but may also produce an expansionist Free Speech
Clause that subordinates and supplants other constitutional rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION

At a First Amendment symposium I organized a few years ago, a foreboding
darkness hung over the subject of the Free Speech Clause. I Speaker after
speaker rose to argue that litigants were aggressively and strategically invoking
the Free Speech Clause, with the result that the clause was trespassing in places
it did not belong. Scholars worried that as a result of these invocations, the Free
Speech Clause's boundaries and principles were being warped. They argued that
we needed to get a grip on the Free Speech Clause before it swallowed up
everything in its path, from professional licensing regulations, to commercial
laws, to data privacy laws, to pharmaceutical disclosure requirements.
The tone of the discussion was set by Professor Fred Schauer's presentation,
which reprised the prospect, raised in some of his earlier work, that in the
absence of a proper "hammer" to beat back commercial and other government
regulations, the Free Speech Clause was being used as an ill-fitting but
sometimes effective "pipe wrench."2 This, in essence, is how Professor Schauer
defines "First Amendment opportunism"-invoking a "plausibly effective but
ill-fitting" First Amendment to do a job better suited to the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or some other constitutional provision. 3
Although Professor Schauer appears to stop short of declaring that
"opportunism" is a pejorative label, he and other scholars have argued that the
phenomenon carries serious risks-to the central values of the Free Speech

1The symposium contributions were published in The Contemporary First
Amendment: Freedom ofSpeech, Press, and Assembly Symposium, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1029 (2015). The symposium's tone was no anomaly. Other scholars have also criticized the
path that free speech precedents and doctrines have recently taken. See, e.g., STEVEN H.
SHlFFRIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? (2016).
2 See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage,
56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1613, 16 .1 4-17 (2015) [hereinafter Schauer, Politics and
Incentives]; see also Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 175 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R.
Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism] (using the hammer
and pipe wrench analogy).
3 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 175-76. Although Schauer
refers generally to the "First Amendment," his examples and analysis show that it is actually
the Free Speech Clause-i.e., not the Press Clause, Assembly Clause, or Petition Clause-that is being invoked in a manner that he deems "opportunistic." Thus, I will refer in this
Article to "free speech opportunism."
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Clause, to free speech doctrine and theory, and even to the prospects for
American self-govemment. 4
These concerns are motivated by authentic desires to preserve coverage and
protection for speech that is truly vital to objects at the core of the modem Free
Speech Clause-in particular, political discourse. Still, it seemed to me then, as
it does now, that the label "opportunism" might sweep too broadly and suggest
a pejoratism that is unwarranted, at least in certain contexts and cases. Simply
put, strategic, enterprising, or what we might call "entrepreneurial" invocations
of the Free Speech Clause are not always or necessarily bad or undesirable.
Indeed, to some degree, the modem Free Speech Clause is deeply rooted in just
these sorts of claims.
Most of the literature and commentary concerning free speech opportunism
has focused on commercial litigants, who are purportedly (mis-)using the Free
Speech Clause as a deregulatory tooJ.S I want to direct attention to a different
context. Broadly speaking, my Article focuses on the category of civil rights
claims. It begins with a claim that has yet to arise, but seems to meet the basic
defmition of"free speech opportunism."6 Some states have passed but repealed,
while others are actively considering, laws or policies that would restrict public
restroom use based on a person's gender.? It seems likely that at some point a
state or locality will restrict restroom use in this manner. It is also a given that
challengers will file suit to enjoin enforcement of any such provision. It is Jess
certain whether the Free Speech Clause will be invoked in such cases. 8
Let us suppose that it will be. Would such an invocation be "opportunistic"?
What standards or factors would assist us in making that determination? And
what would such invocations tell us about the causes and consequences of using
the Free Speech Clause to advance what would seem to be a constitutional
equality claim or movement?
4 &e, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wrs. L. REV. 133, 133 (2016);
Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2017).
5 See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 4, at 134.
6 See generally Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176.
7 E.g., Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act ("House Bill2"), Sess. L. No. 2016-3,
§§ 1.2- 1.3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 12, 12-13 (repealed 2017). North
Carolina's restriction on restroom use was later repealed. According to the National
Conference of State Legislatures, in the 2017 legislative session sixteen states have
considered passing gender-based restrictions on the use of public facilities. Another six states
have considered laws that would preempt localities from enacting protections for transgender
persons. And fourteen states have considered adopting public school policies that would limit
the rights oftransgender students. See Joellen Kralik, "Bathroom Bill" Legislative Tracking,
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.orglresearch/education/bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perrnacc/7KND-ZCXV].
8 To date, courts have avoided deciding constitutional claims, focusing instead on the
application of anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., G .G. ex ref. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (evaluating transgender student's restroom access claim
under Title IX).
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Part II of the Article introduces the concept of "free speech opportunism"
and briefly discusses its purported causes and costs. It also describes the related
phenomenon of free speech "expansionism," which is the concern that
successful free speech opportunism will result in the Free Speech Clause's
occupation of territory that rightfully belongs to other areas of law or different
constitutional provisions.9
Part III turns to the restroom use free speech claim. The example, and the
broader tradition of civil rights free speech litigation of which it would be a part,
highlight some difficulties with the "opportunism" label. On the surface, a
restroom use free speech claim would appear to be quintessentially
opportunistic. The constitutional injury is discrimination in access to a public
facility or place, based on gender or gender orientation. That sounds like an
equal protection issue. However, relative to other available claims, the free
speech argument is quite strong. In specific contexts, restroom use would be
covered and perhaps even protected speech.IO Even assuming that there are
"proper" invocations of the Free Speech Clause-i.e., those that further its
accepted core values11_the restroom use claim seems to qualifY. Moreover, if
successful, such a claim would not produce the kind of opportunism costs critics
have identified. 12 In addition, placed in broader historical context, restroom use
free speech claims would be part of a long and venerable tradition of
entrepreneurial civil rights free speech litigation. Viewed from this perspective,
a restroom use claim would invoke the Free Speech Clause synergistically,
rather than opportunistically, in order to further both free speech and equal
protection values. In sum, in this context, the Free Speech Clause may not be a
perfect hammer; but it also does not seem like a clumsy pipe wrench either.
Part rv uses the restroom use and civil rights examples to further explore
the concept, causes, and consequences of free speech "opportunism." We ought
to resist what Justice Cardozo once referred to as the "tyranny of labels."l3 If
we are going to use the label "opportunism," particularly in a pejorative way,
we ought to do so with precision and care. Whether a particular invocation of
the Free Speech Clause is "opportunistic" requires a careful case-by-case
analysis that includes a consideration of the context, comparative merit, and
likely consequences of each claim. In terms of causes, the Article argues that
part of what may be driving resort to the Free Speech Clause is an increasingly
activist state that is subject to relatively few federal constitutional limits.
Further, we ought to consider not just the potential costs, but also the possible
benefits, of invoking the Free Speech Clause entrepreneurially. Ultimately,
9 See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1199, 1200 (2015).
10 On the distinction between "covered" and "protected" speech, see Frederick Schauer,
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004).
11 See generally Weiland, supra note 4.
12 See irifra Part II.
13 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934).
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critics' focus on the strategic motives of litigants and claimants seems
misplaced. The real concern seems to be the substance of free speech doctrines
and theories. These create opportunities for entrepreneurial free speech activity.
They also raise the specter of an expanding Free Speech Clause that could
subordinate and supplant other constitutional rights. Thus, the Article concludes
that as between free speech "opportunism" and free speech "expansionism," we
ought to be most concerned about the latter.

II. OPPORTUNISM AND EXPANSIONISM
In recent years, a general concern has arisen that litigants are invoking the
Free Speech Clause strategically in order to win cases they would likely lose
under other rights provisions. Some have argued that litigants are dressing up
nonspeech rights claims in free speech garb, in order to reap the benefits of the
Free Speech Clause's generous coverage, protection, and influence.l 4 Much of
the angst concerning this phenomenon relates to commercial litigants, who
critics claim have used the Free Speech Clause as a substitute for the Due
Process Clause and other constitutional provisions.IS A related concern, to
which the label "expansionism" has been applied, is that successful
opportunistic free speech claims will result in the Free Speech Clause colonizing
legal and constitutional territory once occupied by other authorities.l6
Commentators have argued that these two phenomena are associated with what
I refer to below as "opportunism costs."

A. Hammers and Pipe Wrenches
In a 2002 book chapter, Professor Frederick Schauer coined the phrase
"First Amendment opportunism." 17 Professor Schauer used a metaphor to
explain this concept. "Suppose you need to drive a nail into a board but have no
hammer," he asks. IS "You do, however," he continues, "have a pipe wrench."l9
The metaphorical hammer is a constitutional provision that "fits" the facts and
circumstances at hand, and hence provides a proper tool for challenging state
action. The metaphorical pipe wrench is the First Amendment-in particular,
the Free Speech Clause-which stands in for the hammer and does work it was
not designed to do, but which it can accomplish if one applies adequate resolve
and force.

14 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 175-76.
15 Jd. at 177-78.
16 See Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1200 (describing "expansionism" as the situation
"where the First Amendment's territory pushes outward to encompass ever more areas of
law").
17 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176.
18 Jd.atl75.
19 Jd.

~
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Professor Schauer chose to proceed by way of metaphor rather than
definition. A basic dictionary definition of "opportunism" is "the art, policy, or
practice of taking advantage of opportunities or circumstances often with little
regard for principles or consequences."20 In this case, the defmition essentially
tracks the metaphor. Schauer's basic claim is that a wide range oflitigants, faced
with immediate problems and goals but lacking the right constitutional tool to
succeed, have strategically invoked the "plausibly effective but ill-fitting" Free
Speech Clause to do the job. 21 In Schauer's view, "[t]he job frequently gets done
but, as with driving a nail with a pipe wrench, the job gets done poorly and the
tool is damaged in the process."22 As both the metaphor and defmition suggest,
the claim is that opportunistic litigants act with little or no regard for the Free
Speech Clause's appropriate uses or values. 23 They are motivated primarily, if
not solely, by the desire to pound the nail into the board.
Professor Schauer identifies what he claims are opportunistic uses of the
Free Speech Clause in several contexts--commercial speech, nude dancing, the
U.S. military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, and campaign fmance
regulation. 24 In each area, he claims, litigants have turned to the Free Speech
Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or other
constitutional provisions that appear to address the core or fundamental harm
produced by the relevant legal restrictions.25
It is worth noting that many of the nonspeech claims in Schauer's examples
do not appear to be very strong on the merits. For example, Due Process Clause
doctrine dictates that commercial regulations are reviewed only for
"rationality," which typically results in government laws and regulations being
upheld. 26 However, Schauer argues that litigants have frequently turned to the
Free Speech Clause even in cases where the Free Speech Clause claim is of no
greater merit.27 As Schauer puts it, the free speech argument has been "selected
as the winner among the array of implausible claims."28

B. Opportunism Causes
Professor Schauer and others have suggested several possible causes that
have led to an upsurge in free speech opportunism. In constitutional litigation
20 Opportunism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/opportunism [https://pennacc/WB7C-UETV] (last updated Nov. 6, 2017).
21 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 175.
22 !d.
23 See generally Weiland, supra note 4.
24 Schauer also cites free speech arguments by feminists in the antipornography
movement as an example. See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 187
n.52. For additional purported examples of free speech opportunism, see Schauer, Politics
and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1614-16.
25 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 191.
26 See United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
27 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 191.
28 !d. at 186.
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and public discourse, the Free Speech Clause has what Schauer has referred to
as a "magnetic" appeaJ.29 Thus, a litigant seeking the "political and rhetorical
high ground" is generally well-served by a Free Speech Clause that commands
both.30 In U.S. courts, Schauer observes, freedom of speech is often an
"argumentative showstopperO. "3 I
Text and doctrine contribute to this show-stopping quality. Because so
many activities involve communication or "speech" in some respect or degree,
free speech claims often have a surface plausibility that other constitutional
claims do not. 32 As Professor Leslie Kendrick has observed, relatively speaking,
free speech doctrine "provides an unusually robust amount of protection for
activities that fall within its ambit."33
As a result of these general factors, litigants are increasingly turning to the
Free Speech Clause, ill-fitting tool that it is claimed to be,3 4 for the simple reason
that it increases the likelihood their claims will succeed. This, Professor Schauer
concedes, is the primary goal in all types of litigation.35 So long as free speech
doctrine continues to develop in ways that expand or at least do not restrict ~
coverage, litigants are likely to continue to look in the direction of the Free
Speech Clause.36
Professor Schauer identifies a half dozen more specific factors that also may
have contributed to the rise of free speech opportunism. First, owing to its
magnetic quality, judges, politicians, and public figures may be particularly
reluctant to be seen as "against" free speech.37 Second, free speech arguments
might attract "powerful but otherwise ideologically distant allies," which might
suggest that the arguments have broad appeal and are based on neutral
principles. 38 Third, invocation of the Free Speech Clause might be treated as a
patriotic act. 39 Thus, the litigant who invokes the Free Speech Clause might be •
"like the politician who clothes himself in the American flag."40 Fourth, First
Amendment arguments in general might benefit from the fact that the
institutional press, one of their main beneficiaries, has "enormous influence on
29 Schauer, supra note 10, at 1787-800.
30 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 1 76.

31Jd.
32 Seeid.

33 Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1209.

34 Schauer, Politics and incentives, supra note 2, at 1614-16.
35 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 191 ; see also Schauer,
Politics and incentives, supra note 2, at 1625 ("[M]ost lawyers who raise constitutional
claims or defenses do so not out of their own commitment to certain constitutional principles,
but rather because they believe that the constitutional argument will increase their likelihood
of winning.").
36 See Schauer, Politics and incentives, supra note 2, at 1633 (suggesting that recent
Supreme Court precedents point in this direction).
37 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 192.
38 Jd. at 193.
39ld. at 192-93.
40 id. at 193.
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public opinion."41 Fifth, it could be the case that the "cultural penetration" of
organizations, including the ACLU, has led political elites to embrace the Free
Speech Clause. 42 Finally, the Free Speech Clause may have benefitted from the
fact that some of the first to invoke it in the courts-the Jehovah's Witnesseswere generally perceived as posing no serious threat to the established political
or social order.43
In sum, the cause of free speech opportunism has been traced in part to the
unremarkable desire of constitutional litigants to win their cases. However,
Professor Schauer and other commentators have also suggested a variety of
other social, cultural, and doctrinal causes.

C. Opportunism Costs
Commentators have identified a number of what might be called
"opportunism costs" that are associated with free speech opportunism. These
include the possibility that the Free Speech Clause will supplant or subordinate
other constitutional provisions and areas of law. As well, some have expressed
concerns regarding the effects opportunism may have on the Free Speech Clause
itself.
Adopting and expanding on the opportunism critique, Professor Leslie
Kendrick has identified a phenomenon she claims is related to potential misuses
of the Free Speech Clause-"First Amendment expansionism."44 Simply put,
expansionism is a product or effect of successful free speech opportunism. It
involves colonization by the Free Speech Clause of entire areas of law as well
as other constitutional provisions.
As Professor Kendrick explains, when opportunistic speech claims succeed,
the "First Amendment's territory pushes outward to encompass ever more areas
of law."45 Judging by recent commentary, including Kendrick's, a primary
concern seems to be that as commercial litigants have success invoking the Free
Speech Clause, it will occupy more and more of the regulatory landscape. Thus,
deregulatory claims that once were brought under the Due Process Clause, the
Takings Clause, and other constitutional provisions relating to economic liberty
will be recast in the image of the Free Speech Clause. 46
The possibility that the Free Speech Clause will be the vehicle of economic
deregulation is not the only concern. Entire areas of law, from sexual liberty to
campaign finance, could come to be governed by the Free Speech Clause. For
example, as Professor Schauer has suggested, principles of sexual privacy and
41/d.
42 !d.
43 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 193.
44 See generally Kendrick, supra note 9.
45 !d. at 1200.
46 See id. at 1207-08 (discussing Due Process Clause and economic liberty); Schauer,
First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 177-80 (discussing commercial speech
coverage).
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electoral accountability could be translated into Free Speech Clause concerns.47
This could result in significant changes in tenns of how we debate and regulate
a variety of social activities. 48
Just as areas of law like commercial regulation are subject to free speech
colonization, so too is constitutional territory at some risk. As noted, in the
economic realm, commentators have expressed concerns that the Free Speech
Clause is being invoked as a substitute for the Due Process Clause.49 In the most
extreme case, the Free Speech Clause could expand its territorial reach in a way
that supplants most or perhaps all other constitutional rights provisions. This
could ultimately produce a nontextual, generalized "Free Expression Clause"
that governs vast areas of economic and social activity.
In addition to the prospect of expansionism, commentators have identified
a number of other potential opportunism costs. According to Professor Schauer,
one potential opportunism cost might be the significant distortion of the Free
Speech Clause. 50 As he concedes, this presupposes that the Free Speech Clause
is not simply the accretion of precedents over time-i.e., the product of •
numerous common law adjudications-but rather is properly understood to
serve particular values or purposes. 51 If, for example, the primary purpose of the
Free Speech Clause is to facilitate political discourse and collective selfgovernance, then opportunistic misapplications-in the area of commercial
regulation, or sexual liberty, or what have you-may result in a degree of
distortion of the clause's core purposes. 52 In that event, the Free Speech Clause
may "lose its ability to perform the function for which it was originally
designed. " 53
Professor Schauer also identifies another general cost, namely that
Americans will "find ourselves with a cultural understanding of the First ~
Amendment that diverges substantially from what a less misused First
Amendment would have produced."54 At the same time, he allows that it is
possible that the Free Speech Clause is "merely the raw material of opportunism
and nothing else," in which case free speech opportunism "can no longer be
perceived as a problem, but will have told us something revealing about just
what the First Amendment is."55 Again, recognizing this as an opportunism cost
depends significantly on whether there is in fact a "legally undistorted idea" of
47 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 183, 190.
4 8 See id. at 183 (arguing that free speech opportunism may have the unintended
consequence of"moving the First Amendment in such a way that it is taken as the appropriate
repository, both in court and in broader public discourse, for the full range of arguments and
beliefs about all forms of sexual liberty").
49 See, e.g., id. at 177-78.
50 ld. at 195.
51 Jd. at 195-96.
52 Jd. at 194-95.
53 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 195.
54Jd. at 176 (footnote omitted).
55 Jd. at 195-96.
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the Free Speech Clause-something Professor Schauer admits has not yet been
established. 56
Professor Schauer provides some examples of more specific doctrinal
distortions that may occur as a result of free speech opportunism. For example,
he suggests that the nondeference typically applied to government regulators in
free speech cases might be watered down or even reversed in certain cases or
areas .57 Relatedly, Professor Schauer suggests that the tradition of independent
appellate review in free speech cases could be weakened as a result of free
speech opportunism. 58Jt is also possible, he argues, that the strictures of existing
categories of "uncovered" speech, including incitement to unlawful activity,
will be watered down as they are applied to noncore speech. 59 At the same time,
however, Professor Schauer allows that not all of these changes are necessarily
or inevitably undesirable.60
Other scholars have been less ambivalent. One commentator has argued that
free speech opportunism could lead to the demolition of the administrative state
and the demi!'e of self-government. 61 Another has argued that traditional
libertarian free speech theories may not survive the phenomenon of free speech
opportunism.62 A primary concern of opportunism's critics is that the
phenomenon will lead to massive deregulation in a number of areas, including
business and data privacy.63 In sum, commentators are concerned that if free
speech claims are successful in these and other areas, government will be unable
to pursue important public health, safety, and privacy interests.64
Despite these potentially serious costs, it is somewhat surprising how
ambivalent some commentators seemingly remain about free speech
opportunism. Again, at one point Professor Schauer chalks free speech
opportunism up to good lawyering-"lawyering in general is opportunistic," he
writes, "and necessarily and properly so."65 More generally, Schauer observes
that the term "opportunistic" is one that "hovers precariously between the
pejorative and the complimentary."66 Perhaps most tellingly, he hesitates to
refer to any particular invocation of the Free Speech Clause as a "misuse" of the
provision. Again, the reason for this reluctance is that such judgments would
presuppose what has yet to be established-i.e., agreement regarding what
constitutes a "proper" use of the Free Speech Clause.67
56 !d. at 196.
57 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1635.
58Jd.
59Jd.
60 !d. at 1636.
61 See Shanor, supra note 4, at 206.
62 See Weiland, supra note 4, at 1389.
63 See Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1501, 1507-08 (2015). See generally Kendrick, supra note 9.
64 Shanor, supra note 4, at 205; Weiland, supra note 4, at 1469-71.
65 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1625.
66 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176.
6? !d. at 176-77 n.4.
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III. RESTROOM USE AND OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS FREE SPEECH CLAIMS
Having discussed the basic concept, the purported causes, and the possible
costs of free speech opportunism, I turn to what I hope will be an illuminating
example: free speech challenges to gender-based restrictions on public restroom
use. On the surface, this seems like the sort of"opportunistic" free speech claim
some scholars might be concerned about. However, the claim highlights some
of the potential problems with the opportunism label.

A. Would the Restroom Use Free Speech Claim Be "Opportunistic"?
In March 2016, North Carolina enacted the Public Facilities Privacy and
Security Act-officially known as "An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple
Occupancy Bathroom and Changing Facilities in Schools and Public Agencies
and to Create Statewide Consistency in Regulation of Employment and Public
Accommodations."68 The law, which was enacted in response to a Charlotte ···
ordinance that extended anti-discrimination protections to gay, lesbian, and
transgender persons,69 eliminated these protections and prohibited localities
from enacting them in the future.?O In addition, the North Carolina law provided
that in government buildings, individuals could only use the restroom or
changing facility that corresponded to the sex on their birth certificate.7 1 Under
the law, transgender persons who did not or were not able to change the gender
identity on their birth certificate would have been barred from using the
restroom that corresponded to their gender identity.72
A group of plaintiffs challenged the North Carolina law, including the
restroom access provisions, in federal court. They alleged that the law violated
Title lX's prohibition on sex discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Due Process Clause. 73 Recently, owing in part to actual and threatened
boycotts of the state by sports organizations and consumers across the country,
the North Carolina law was partially repealed.7 4 The restroom provision was
part of this repeaJ.7 5 Nevertheless, as noted earlier, many states are considering

68 Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act ("House Bill 2"), Sess. L. No. 2016-3, 2016
N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 12 (repealed 2017).
69 Steve Harrison, Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT Protections in 7-4 Vote,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politicsgovernrnent/article61786967.htrnl [https://permacc/BFL4-6EEH].
70 Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, sec. 2.1, § 95-25.1(c).
11Jd at sec. 3.3, § 143-760.
12 See id
73 Carcal'lo v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 621 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
74 Colleen Jenkins & Daniel Trotta, Seeking End to Boycott, North Carolina Rescinds
Transgender Bathroom Law, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-north-carolina-lgbt/seeking-end-to-boycott-north-carolina-rescinds-transgenderbathroom-law-idUSKBN 171 1V4 [https://perma.cc/MM76-S3GH].
75 See Kralik, supra note 7.
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adopting laws similar to North Carolina's.7 6 And many public school districts
are considering adopting policies that would impact transgender students'
restroom use in similar ways. 77
The legal challenge to North Carolina's law did not include a Free Speech
Clause count.7 8 For purposes of the analysis that follows, I want to assume that
some future litigant will invoke the Free Speech Clause, perhaps among other
constitutional rights provisions. What reasons might litigants have to pursue a
Free Speech Clause claim in this context? Assuming that there are indeed
"appropriate" invocations of the Free Speech Clause, is this free speech claim
properly characterized as a misuse of the clause? What consequences would
follow in the event the Free Speech Clause claim was successful?
Recall that "opportunistic" claims are ones that repackage equal protection,
due process, and other constitutional claims as free speech claims, primarily in
order to convince courts to grant constitutional relief.79 On the surface, the
hypothetical restroom claim seems like a textbook example. The fundamental
harm is discrimination in the use of restroom facilities, which is coveredconstitutionally-by either the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause.
Thus, this seems to be a nonspeech constitutional claim masquerading as a free
speech claim. The free speech argument is a "second-best fallback position,"80
a "pipe wrench" doing a job best left to a "hammer." Invoking the Free Speech
Clause in this context would appear to be a strategic ploy to increase the chances
of winning the case, rather than an effort to facilitate or advance Free Speech
Clause interests or values.
This is a perfectly understandable way to view such a claim. After all, one
uses the restroom to relieve oneself, not to communicate anything. If there is
any constitutional harm in restricting restroom use, it would not seem to fall
under the coverage or protection of the Free Speech Clause. The plaintiff just
wants to win her case, and the "pipe wrench" Free Speech Clause might get the
job done.
However, this type of claim raises questions about what factors or criteria
distinguish "opportunistic" from more appropriate Free Speech Clause claims.
Surely it is not sufficient simply to note the facial oddity of connecting restroom
use and freedom of speech. After all, at least in the abstract, burning a flag does
not seem particularly expressive. But free speech claims are not developed and
advanced in a vacuum. They arise in factual, jurisprudential, historical, and
political settings that presumably inform the question whether a particular claim
constitutes an opportunistic misuse or misappropriation of the Free Speech
76Jd.
77 See, e.g., Denise Smith Amos, Pros, Cons Offered on Duval Schools Bathroom
Limits on Transgender Students, JACKSONVILLE.COM (May 23, 2016), http:/,jacksonville.com
/news/metro/2016-05-23/story/pros-cons-offered-duval-schools-bathroom-limits-transgenderstudents [https://perma.cc/W65V-ESBL].
78 See generally Carcaiio, 203 F. Supp. 3d.
79 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 175-76.
80 Jd. at 185.
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Clause. Although we cannot know the motives of litigants, these contextual
considerations can help us determine whether a particular claim is
"opportunistic."
According to opportunism critics, in many cases litigants are unnecessarily
resorting to the Free Speech Clause. The supposition is that they are choosing
the Free Speech Clause over equally viable, or equally nonviable, constitutional
claims. 81 In fact, however, litigants frequently do not choose between claims at
all but instead pursue them cumulatively or in the aggregate.8 2 Faced with a
relatively small menu of constitutional choices, litigants frequently pursue
multiple rights claims in the hope that one will ultimately prevaiJ.83
In any event, opportunism critics argue that even though it provides no
greater degree of assurance that plaintiffs will prevail, the free speech argument
is often chosen to do all of the work.8 4 So one of the things we would
presumably want to know in assessing whether a free speech claim is
opportunistic is whether plaintiffs had other equally viable alternative claims.
This requires that we somehow measure the relative strength of the claims. ·
Granted, this can be a difficult endeavor. However, to state that litigants are
relying on the Free Speech Clause when doctrines are effectively "equal," and
in many cases equally bad, is to make an empirical claim. Finally, although we
cannot discover the motives and purposes of litigants who file free speech
claims, we can assess whether their claims would advance principles and values
related to the Free Speech Clause as these are presently understood.
Opportunistic invocations are, by definition, unconcerned with such values and
principles. 85
What do these factors or criteria tell us about the hypothetical restroom use
example? The equal protection and due process claims are not particularly 'strong. Unless lower courts are inclined to get ahead of the Supreme Court and
adopt the view that trans gender status is "suspect," or that discrimination against
transgender persons is a form of gender discrimination (approaches available to,
but not taken by, the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court's
marriage equality decision),86 litigants are likely to have a very difficult time
prevailing on equal protection grounds. Thus, while restricting public restroom
facility use based on birth gender certainly sounds like an equal protection harm,

8! See, e.g., id. at 186.
82 See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U.
L. REv. 1309, 1310 (2017) (discussing "cumulative," "hybrid," and "intersectional" rights
claims). See generally Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L.
REv. 1067 (2016) (examining Supreme Court decisions that combine rights to dispose of
cases).
83 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 82, at 1310.
84 See generally Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2.
85 See id. at 176.
86 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-{)4 (2015) (invoking the Equal
Protection Clause along with the Due Process Clause to support recognition of a right to
marriage equality).
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equal protection doctrine and precedents may not presently recognize this
particular harm or may not provide a sound basis for challenging the restroom
limitation. Further, the government's purported interests in public safety and
privacy may well provide a rational basis for discriminating based on birth
gender in this particular context.
As for the Due Process Clause, Obergefell's opening lines observe that the
Constitution protects "a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity."87 This
conception of "liberty" is grounded in the Due Process Clause, but it rests on a
connection between self-identification and expression. Thus, Obergefe/1 does
not recognize a fundamental right to self-identify as male or female;88 however,
it may strengthen a free speech claim relating to gender identification.
Moreover, although the Due Process Clause protects a sphere of sexual liberty,
the precedents in that area speak to intimate decision-making in areas such as
private sexual activity and reproductive choice.89 Although it is related to
intimate biological functions, public restroom use seems quite far afield of
current privacy jurisprudence. Under current doctrine, courts are not likely to
recognize a fundamental right to use the public restroom of one's choice.
By contrast, under existing free speech doctrine the Free Speech Clause
claim seems relatively strong. In order to be covered under the Free Speech
Clause, the communication or act must constitute "speech.'>90 The "coverage"
question asks simply whether an act such as choosing and using a public
restroom is "speech" within the domain of the Free Speech Clause.91 When a
person relies not on the spoken or written word, but on symbolic acts, to convey
her message or idea the Supreme Court has nominally required that (1) the actor
intend to communicate some message and (2) an audience is likely to understand
the message.92
The Supreme Court has itself not always been consistent in terms of
applying this standard. Indeed, sometimes the Court does not explicitly apply
the standard at all. In several cases, it has simply assumed coverage. Thus,
burning a draft card as part of a political protest, burning the flag in a similar
context, and sleeping outdoors as part of a protest oflaws affecting the homeless
have all been at least assumed to be "speech" properly within the coverage of
the Free Speech Clause.93 Although the Court has warned that it cannot accept
the proposition that an infinite variety of conduct will be considered "speech"
87 I d. at 2593 (emphasis added).
88 See id.
89 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating state criminal
sodomy statute).
90 See Schauer, supra note 10, at 1766-Q7.
91 Id. at 1769.
92 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
93 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1984)
(assuming that sleeping outdoors is expressive conduct); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376 (1968) (assuming that burning draft card is expressive conduct).
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within the meaning of the Free Speech Clause,94 under the governing standard
so long as an act has some communicative aspect or characteristic, then courts
are quite likely to answer the coverage question in the affirmative.95 In other
words, the coverage bar is rather low.
Under this doctrine, the claim that gender-based restrictions on restroom use
at least implicate the Free Speech Clause hardly seems fanciful. The question is
not whether a person's use of the restroom-or draft card burning, or flag
burning, or sleeping, or stripping~ommunicates something in the abstract.
Rather, the question is whether, in a particular context, choice or use of
restroom intentionally communicates something that an audience is likely to
understand.96 Under this loose, contextualized standard, some transgender
plaintiffs can satisfY the Free Speech Clause's coverage requirements.
To make the analysis more tangible, consider the case of a public high
school student who is a transgender female-i.e., a biological male who
identifies as and desires to live in all respects as female.9 7 Her public school has
a policy that requires either that the student use the boys' restroom or use a ::
separate unisex restroom. Is the use of the girls' restroom covered speech under·.
the Free Speech Clause?98 Consider also a facility that is open to the public, and
subject to a similar law. Under Spence, does the student or member of the public
intend to convey any message when she uses the girls' restroom, and is an
audience likely to understand what is being conveyed? Or, stated differently,
can we at least assume that in this particular context use of the girls' restroom
has some communicative aspect or characteristic?99
Some commentators have analyzed the free speech implications of acts
relating to gender identity. 100 Jeffrey Kosbie has addressed the communicative
nature of gendered dress and gendered conduct-including restroom use. He.•
94 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
95see Hurley v.lrish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. ofBos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,

569 (1995) ("[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection.").
96 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410--11.
97 See Carcafio v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 621 n.l (M.D.N.C. 2016).
98 The Free Speech Clause also prohibits government from requiring speakers to
convey messages or beliefs they do not agree with or support. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631-34 (1943). The requirement that the student use the boys'
restroom might also compel the communication of a message about gender identity that the
student does not wish to convey.
99 Cf Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 2000) (granting preliminary injunction against school officials who prohibited a
transgender female from wearing female attire or otherwise appearing as female as a
condition of enrollment).
100 See, e.g., Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State interests in Regulating Gender: How
Suppression of Gender Nonconformity Violates Freedom of Speech, 19 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 187, 187 (2013); Christine L. Olson, Transgender Foster Youth: A Forced
identity, 19 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 25, 34 (2009); Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill:
Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y .U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 89, 123 (2015).
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concludes that dress, appearance, and restroom use can all be considered speech
under current free speech doctrine.l 01 Kosbie's principal claim is that these
actions communicate the social meaning of gender. 102 Audiences that witness
gendered acts, such as how a person dresses or which restroom she uses,
typically understand that a conception of gender is being conveyed--even if
they do not necessarily attach a specific message to particular actions.1 03
As Kosbie observes, communication of and respecting gender is deeply
embedded in our social norms concerning masculinity and femininity.104 When
the state mandates that a transgender girl dress as a boy, disciplines a male
officer for wearing earrings while off duty, awards child custody to a mother
based on concerns about how a child would understand a father's gender
transition, or prohibits a transgender female from using the girls' restroom, it
suppresses gender nonconformity. 105 In each context, the state is essentially
defming what it means to be "masculine" or "feminine." And it is doing so by
means of rules and restrictions that suppress communicative actions that defy or
dissent from officially prescribed definitions of male and female. 106
With regard specifically to restroom use, Kosbie observes that "[e]veryone
communicates a message of gender identity by using a single-sex restroom."107
Whether consciously or not, audiences use social norms to ascribe gender
meaning to restroom choice just as they do the choice whether to wear a dress
or a tuxedo. As Kosbie notes: "Restroom choice is deliberate and intended to
communicate a central aspect of identity: 'I am a woman,' or 'I am a man."'108
Current free speech standards do not require courts to accept all of these
general observations, much less the gender construction theories that underlie
them, in order to conclude that restroom use is communicative. What is
necessary is that in a specific case-as, for example, with respect to my
hypothetical high school student or member of the public-the use by a
transgender person of a particular restroom has a communicative element. For
both the student and the member of the public, restroom use may well be "a
powerful act of self-definition." 109 When they use a girls' restroom, these
individuals intend to communicate gender or femininity. In the context of a
controversial school policy that restricts restroom use based on birth gender, the
audience of students and administrators is quite likely to understand this
101 Kosbie, supra note 100, at 205-06.
102 /d. at 206--07.
103 Id at 200.
104 Id at 200-01.

105 Id at 191.
106/d at 193-94.
107 Kosbie, supra note 100, at 206.
108 Jd at 243; cf Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (concluding that transgender student's "dressing in clothing and
accessories traditionally associated with the female gender" was "not merely a personal
preference but a necessary symbol of her very identity" that "express[ed] her identification
with that gender").
109 Kosbie, supra note 100, at 251.

2017]

FREE SPEECH "OPPORTUNISM"

979

message. Moreover, if there are negative reactions to the student's use of the
girls' restroom, which many transgender persons report, 110 these too may
demonstrate that at least some audience members readily understand-indeed,
strongly reject-the student's statement of gender nonconformity. 111 A similar
context and controversy might also render use of particular public facilities
expressive-the user intends to convey a message about gender, and the public
may understand that this is the case.
All of this goes to the coverage question. It does not establish that choice
and use of a particular restroom is necessarily a form ofprotected speech, either
in the context of the high school example or in the more general context of use
of public facilities. In the schools context, restroom use restrictions that target
the message of gender identity are presumed invalid.l 12 Expressive restroom use
that interferes with the learning environment could be regulated, but only where
there is evidence that the choice of restroom is causing material and substantial
disruption. 11 3 Outside the schools, a court would ftrst determine whether the
restroom restriction was in any way related to the communication of a message ::
of gender identity. If so, then a rigorous "strict scrutiny" standard will apply. 114
If not, then an "intermediate scrutiny" standard would be applied to the restroom
use restriction. 11 5 The government's interests in ensuring safety or protecting
privacy might be adequate to justify some gendered restrictions on restroom use,
but in a particular case a court might also find no evidence to support such
interests.
In any event, the coverage argument seems to be stronger in these free
speech contexts than in the context of equal protection or due process claims. In
the event free speech coverage is found to exist, judicial review would be more
rigorous than the "rational basis" standard likely to apply under either the Equal
Protection Clause or Due Process Clause.
What about opportunism costs? As discussed earlier, some worry that
successful invocations of the Free Speech Clause will distort its doctrines or
expand its territory in a manner that displaces other legal concepts or

liO Jody L. Hennan, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation
of Gender and its Impact on Transgender People's Lives, 19 J. PUB. MGMT. & Soc. POL'Y
65, 72 (2013).
111 Kosbie, supra note 100, at 206.
112 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) ("In our
system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.").
11 3 Jd. at 509-10 (discussing disruption requirement and noting that undifferentiated fear
is not a valid ground for limiting students' speech).
114p(easant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,469 (2009) ("[A]ny restriction based
on the content of the speech must satisfY strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest ....").
115 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (announcing an intermediate
standard of scrutiny for content-neutral regulations of speech). See generally Ashutosh
Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate &rutiny in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783, 784 (2007).
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constitutional provisions. 116 Neither of these concerns is raised by my
hypothetical claims.
As noted, interpreting restroom use to be, or even just assuming 1t 1s,
expressive would result from application of longstanding free speech
precedents. 117 One may certainly take issue with those precedents, as many
critics have. 11 8 However, in the restroom example, invocation of the Free
Speech Clause would follow, not distort, applicable free speech doctrine relating
to symbolic conduct and content regulation. Nor, in the event such claims were
to be successful, is there any danger that the Free Speech Clause would displace
the Equal Protection Clause or any other nonspeech provision. As I discuss
below, in this context the Free Speech Clause might serve the traditional
function of facilitating those non speech constitutional claims. In that event, the
free speech claims would represent a synergistic, not opportunistic, use of the
Free Speech Clause.
Would the free speech claims be opportunistic in the sense that they would
not be concerned with, much less serve, any free speech values? No. In fact, the
hypothetical restroom use claims implicate, and if successful would serve, all
of the principal Free Speech Clause values or justifications that courts and
scholars have identified.ll9 Individual autonomy and self-fulfillment values
support gender exploration and the communication of gender identity.
Marketplace or truth-seeking values are also implicated by gender
nonconformance, which tests principles of gender construction and allows
individuals to contest the ''truth" of official orthodoxy regarding gender.
Perhaps most importantly, given the weight many free speech theorists give to
political speech and collective self-government, 120 resistance to gender
orthodoxy can be viewed as a form of political dissent. Insofar as laws and
policies relating to dress, child custody, and restroom use rely upon gender to
distribute public benefits and burdens, they touch upon matters of public
concern that are relevant to how gender is to be taken into account by democratic
institutions.
It might be tempting to snigger at the notion that restroom use is a political
concern. However, as one commentator has observed: "From the Industrial
Revolution to Jim Crow to women's lib to today, restrooms have been a proxy
for political fights on almost every major issue in American life-race, class,

11 6 See supra Part II. C.
117 See infra Part III.B.
118 See Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1210-12.
119 See generally Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An inquiry into the
Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1305 (1998)
(discussing principal free speech justifications).
120 See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REv.
477, 484 (2011).
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gender, crime, sexuality, you name it." 121 Thus, "[f]or more than 100 years,
Americans have projected their most profound fears about social change onto
public restrooms."l22 Southern officials segregated public restrooms by race,
police raided public restrooms looking for gay male predators lurking in the
shadows, and Phyllis Schlafly warned that equal rights for women meant loss
of the private sanctuary of the ladies' restroom. 123 Restrooms, then, are potent
symbols of gender, race, sexual orientation, and other forms of political
oppression.
Based on the opportunism criteria discussed above, a free speech challenge
to a public restroom policy restricting access based on birth gender ought not to
be considered a misapplication or misuse of the Free Speech Clause. Judged
relative to other rights claims and according to free speech values, such a claim
would be stronger and would advance First Amendment values.

B. Free Speech Litigation and Civil Rights
Broader contextual concerns may also inform whether a particular free
speech claim is opportunistic. Restroom use free speech claims would actually
belong to a long tradition of civil rights free speech litigation.
Most of the commentary regarding free speech "opportunism" and
"expansionism" focuses on commercial litigants' recent resort to the Free
Speech Clause.I24 However, entrepreneurial invocations of the Free Speech
Clause long predated this phenomenon. Throughout American history, civil
rights activists have frequently invoked the Free Speech Clause in
entrepreneurial and enterprising ways. They have leveraged the recognition and
exercise of free speech rights to facilitate constitutional movements relating to._
racial equality, religious liberty, and LGBT rights.125
In its early phases, the NAACP's constitutional assault on racial apartheid
relied heavily on the Free Speech Clause_l26 The NAACP invoked the Free
Speech Clause to challenge application of trespass laws in the context of lunch
counter sit-ins, public disorder laws as applied to a silent protest in a public
library reading room, restrictions on soliciting clients for the purpose of

121 Neil J. Young, How the Bathroom Wars Shaped America, POLITICO (May 18, 2016),
http:/lwww.politico.com/magazine/story/20 16/05(20 16-bathroom-bills-politics-north-carolinalgbt-transgender-history-restrooms-era-civil-rights-213902 [https://permacc!H2RL-J5NK].
122 Id.
123/d.
124 See, e.g., Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 177-90.
125 See generally CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A
CONTENTIOUS HISTORY (20 17) (examining the role the First Amendment played in the
LGBT rights movement); Timothy Zick, The Dynamic Relationship Between Freedom of
Speech and Equality, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PuB. POL'Y 13, 14-15 (2016)(discussing the
manner in which free speech rights facilitated racial and LGBT equality).
126 See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965)
(describing civil rights advocates' use of expressive rights to advance racial equality).
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litigating civil rights cases, application of state civil libel laws, and demands for
the organization's rank-and-file membership Iists.127
Much like the restroom use example, many of these early challenges appear
on the surface to meet the definition of free speech "opportunism."128 The
central harm produced by laws segregating persons by race or singling them out
for exclusion based on race was not the denial of freedom of speech, but the
denial of equal protection of the laws and basic dignity rights. These are,
respectively, Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause concerns. As
well, the Assembly Clause and the Press Clause would seem more germane to
protecting the rights of persons to gather with one another and to publish
information. However, doctrines under those nonspeech provisions had not yet
fully ripened. Thus, the Free Speech Clause was often invoked in their stead.129
In other words, civil rights litigants "repackaged" what were then rather
dubious or weak Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause claims in
equally dubious--or, at the time, perhaps even more questionable-Free Speech
Clause wrappers. The free speech claims offered some relief from racial
segregation and other aspects of de jure discrimination. The Free Speech Clause
was also used to create new organizational expressive rights and to expand
freedom of the press. In sum, in a world in which no effective "hammers" were
readily available, civil rights litigants frequently reached for the Free Speech
Clause "pipe wrench" to seek relief from racial apartheid.
I am not aware of any commentary that characterizes these claims as
"opportunistic," suggests that they were inappropriately strategic or cynical
invocations of the free speech guarantee, or criticizes them as "misuses" of the
Free Speech Clause. To the contrary, commentators have praised the NAACP's
free speech strategy as a brilliant, if not wholly successful, means of advancing
the twin causes of freedom of expression and-ultimately-racial equality.l30
It would be wrong to treat the Free Speech Clause as an imposter during the
civil rights era. After all, the NAACP was seeking to advance the political free

127see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (invalidating breach ofpeace
conviction arising from silent and peaceful protest in a public library reading room);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46 (1966) (holding that convictions for trespass based on
unauthorized protest near jail did not violate First Amendment); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 572-73 (1965) (overturning conviction for picketing near a courthouse); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963) (invalidating breach of peace convictions
arising from peaceful civil rights protest); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 162-63 (1961)
(invalidating breach of peace convictions on procedural due process grounds).
128 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176.
129 See Garner, 368 U.S. at 162 (arguing that lunch counter sit-ins were expressive);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (finding an ordinance requiring identification of
publisher "would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of
expression").
130 See generally KALVEN, supra note 126.
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speech rights of its members, and of equality advocates more generally .131 At
the same time, it was using the Free Speech Clause to advance its equal
protection aims. 132
During this era, the Free Speech Clause did not colonize or supplant the
Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause. Rather, it facilitated their
elucidation and eventual enforcement. In doctrinal terms, discrimination based
on expressive content would eventually come to be policed under the Free
Speech Clause, while discrimination based on race and other suspect
characteristics would become the domain of the Equal Protection Clause. The
situation is a bit more complicated regarding the Assembly Clause and the Press
Clause, both of which were cited by the Supreme Court in iconic decisions that
also raised Free Speech Clause claims. 133 As discussed below, over time the
Free Speech Clause has come to supplant these provisions. But that was not the
fault of civil rights litigators, who invoked the Free Speech Clause along with
neighboring press and assembly rights.
Civil rights free speech entrepreneurism leveraged the synergies between ~
the Free Speech Clause and other constitutional rights, such as equal protection ·
and due process. LGBT activists picked up where race equality predecessors left
off. Owing in part to the thin protections offered to LGBT persons under the
Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause, they too frequently invoked
the Free Speech Clause--even where it did not offer a clear basis for relief. This
was particularly the case during the early phases of the LGBT equality
movement, when litigants energetically pursued First Amendment claims.J34
Since equal protection and due process hammers were not available, litigants
focused instead on establishing rights to openly identity as gay or lesbian, to
publish information about sexual orientation, to assemble for expressive _
purposes, and to come out to employers.135 Not all of these efforts were
successfuJ.136 And as discussed below, some of them have been criticized as
"opportunistic." 137 However, invocation and enforcement of the Free Speech
Clause performed a critical function in terms of advancing both the First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights ofLGBT persons.
In addition to the doctrinal considerations discussed earlier, this sort of
broad context is relevant to an assessment of whether a particular free speech
131 The Struggle for Civil Rights and the First Amendment, NAT'L COALITION AGAINST
CENSORSHlP, http://ncac.org/resource/the-struggle-for-civil-rights-and-the-first-amendment
[https://perma.cc/55QA-SZQ4].
132see Garner, 368 U.S. at 162-63.
133 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,389-90 (1967) (citing both the Free Speech
Clause and the Press Clause); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,235 (1963) (citing
both the Free Speech Clause and the Assembly Clause).
134 See generally BALL, supra note 125.
135 See id.
136see Zick, supra note 125, at 30-33 (discussing failed efforts to challenge the Don't
Ask, Don't Tell regulations on free speech grounds).
137 See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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claim is "opportunistic." In isolation, a claim that public restroom access bears
on the freedom of speech might seem dubious. However, the claim resembles
many of the public facilities claims brought by race and LGBT equality
activists.l38 It belongs to a long tradition of civil rights free speech advocacy in
which civil rights proponents sought first to establish expressive identity and
other political rights, which they later leveraged into equality and other rights.

IV. "OPPORTUNISM" AND "EXPANSIONISM" REVISITED
My hope is that the restroom use example, and the civil rights free speech
tradition of which it would be a part, will help us better understand the concept,
causes, and consequences of what critics have labeled free speech
"opportunism." 139 If we are going to use this label, which I believe is pejorative,
we ought to proceed with caution. In terms of what might be causing the uptick
in Free Speech Clause invocations, we need to consider two additional factors:
the role of the increasingly activist state and the relative paucity of constitutional
provisions that limit its powers. Finally, as to consequences, it is worth
considering whether there might be benefits, for both freedom of speech and
nonspeech rights, associated with what I prefer to call "entrepreneurial" free
speech claims. At the end of the day, we need to identify with precision the
actual target or targets of criticism. Although the "opportunism" label suggests
a critique oflitigants or litigation tactics, it seems to be aimed more squarely at
the substance of Free Speech Clause doctrines and the opportunities for
expansionism that these doctrines create.140

A. The "Tyranny ofLabels"
In the context of interpreting and applying constitutional principles, Justice
Cardozo once warned against the "tyranny oflabels."141 He cautioned that resort
to labels has been a "fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory."142
Although free speech "opportunism" is not a constitutional theory or
principle, Cardozo's caution applies. Critics have developed a descriptive and
normative critique of the manner in which a particular constitutional
provision-the Free Speech Clause--has been invoked and utilized across a

138 See, e.g., supra note 127 and accompanying text; see also BALL, supra note 125, at
62--66.

139 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176 (defining "First
Amendment 'opportunism"').
140 See Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1205--06; Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism,
supra note 2, at 176.
141 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934).
142 Jd.
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range of different subject areas. 143 Unless we are precise about the factors that
give rise to its application, the "opportunism" label cannot tell us which claims
are to be treated as illegitimate or problematic. If there are indeed free speech
claims that deserve to be called "opportunistic," and if such claims portend the
negative consequences some have ascribed to them, it is important that we be
able to identify and single them out.
There is a fundamental problem at the core of the opportunism concept. To
allege a misuse or misapplication of the Free Speech Clause presupposes the
existence of some agreed-upon category of proper uses or applications of the
clause. However, critics of free speech "opportunism" readily concede thatthere
is no current agreement regarding what suffices as a "proper" invocation of the
Free Speech Clause. 144 The absence of such agreed-upon criteria provides an
independent reason to be skeptical of the "opportunism" label. Absent such
criteria, it may be unfair, if not unjustifiable, to accuse litigants and advocates
of exercising bad stewardship over the Free Speech Clause.
Let us assume that traditional core values or justifications-in particular the
concerns regarding self-government and protection of political speech--provide
the relevant baseline. Let us also assume that litigants who fail to pursue these
objectives are acting opportunistically and thus inappropriately. This means that
the "opportunism" label is pejorative-a determination that the dictionary
defmition and most of the commentary on the subject seem to support.' 4 5
As in other areas of law, there is no shortage of facially silly-sounding
arguments in constitutional law. As I have suggested, however, what might look
like a silly or frivolous claim on its face can become much less obviously so
when considered in its full context. The restroom example, and similar civil
rights free speech claims, highlight this lesson. Absent any context, claims that
using a public restroom facility, sitting at a lunch counter, or standing in a public
library reading room violate the Free Speech Clause seem instrumental and
strategic. However, in the context of social and constitutional movements that
have relied on diverse forms of communication to contend for equal rights, some
or all of those claims appear to be far more principled. Indeed, most if not all of
them support or facilitate traditional Free Speech Clause principles and
justifications like those just mentioned. Even those that are primarily designed
to accomplish nonspeech goals-i.e., to facilitate recognition of equal
protection rights-are well within what we might consider the "normal" usages

143 See,

e.g., Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1208--09 (discussing examples of"opportunistic"
Free Speech Clause cases); Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 17790 (citing cases that invoked the Free Speech Clause).
144 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176 n.4; see Kendrick,
supra note 9, at 1210-ll.
145 Opportunism, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS (2d ed. 2002)
(defining opportunism as "the adapting of one's actions, thoughts, etc. to circumstances, as
in politics, without regard for principles"); see also Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism,
supra note 2, at 175-76.
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of the Free Speech Clause. The claims advance free speech values including
self-government, the search for truth, and self-actualization.
When judging whether claims are "opportunistic," we ought to consider the
question as holistically and neutrally as possible. Motivations for raising free
speech claims are often mixed, and litigants are not driven solely by the desire
to win specific cases (although that is certainly one short-term goal).146 As the
civil rights and LGBT examples show, free speech claims may be part of a longterm strategy that combines free speech and nonspeech rights.147
Moreover, the "opportunism" label ought not to be applied categorically, to
an entire class of claims. For instance, not all "commercial" litigants are
motivated solely or predominantly by deregulatory and economic concerns.
Indeed, the case that first brought "commercial speech" under the coverage of
the Free Speech Clause concerned advertisements for abortion services.l48 The
speech in that case both involved a commercial service and facilitated the
exercise of a newly recognized constitutional right. 149 Thus, even the narrative
regarding commercial speech "opportunism" might be more complicated once
one digs beneath the surface.
It is also important to carefully-and realistically-assess the possible
alternatives that are available to claimants. Use of the label "opportunism"
implies that plaintiffs often have better options in terms of framing and
executing lawsuits but still gravitate toward the Free Speech Clause for strategic
reasons. 150 In many cases, the assumption that plaintiffs have many viable--or
even equally unviable---options in terms of rights claims seems highly
questionable. In some of the examples considered above, arguments based on
nonspeech constitutional rights were either weak or all but foreclosed under
existing doctrines. 151 Thus, it may not be the case that plaintiffs prefer to rely
on the Free Speech Clause, rather than other provisions, owing to its cultural
salience, so much as it is a reality that most if not all other avenues are either far
less viable or simply unavailable. In any event, where more than one rights
provision is potentially in play and the Free Speech Clause is among the
possibilities, we need to engage in a fair and careful comparison of all plausible
claims.
Some critics of "opportunism" do take these sorts of considerations into
account. However, sometimes they minimize the strength of the Free Speech
146 See Stephen L. Washy, Civil Rights Litigation by Organizations: Constraints and
Choices, 68 JUDICATURE 337, 339 (1985) (describing litigation during the civil rights
movement).
147 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
148 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (invalidating restriction on
abortion advertising in part because "the activity advertised pertained to constitutional
interests").
149 See id.
150 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 184-85 (describing the
choice to seek to overturn Don't Ask Don't Tell using the Free Speech Clause).
151 See id. at 184 (identifying "dubious" constitutional arguments).
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Clause argument in ways that suggest a false equivalency with alternative
nonspeech claims.
As discussed, one of Professor Schauer's central claims is that litigants are
turning to the Free Speech Clause even though the free speech arguments are
just as dubious as arguments they could make under other provisions. 152 For
example, Professor Schauer argues that Free Speech Clause challenges to the
U.S. military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell regulations were classic examples of free
speech "opportunism." 153 He contends that the essential harm of Don't Ask,
Don't Tell (DADT) was not its inhibition of speech, but its denial of equality
and due process rights. 154
Schauer concedes that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on equal
protection and due process grounds, owing primarily to the fact that the Supreme
Court had not recognized LGBT rights under either provision.l55 But he
nevertheless maintains that the DADT free speech claims were "doctrinally
dubious," in part because the Supreme Court had held that government was
permitted to use a person's speech as evidence of a crime. 156 Indeed, he argues
that the free speech claims were even more dubious than other constitutional
claims plaintiffs did not assert-including arguments that the regulations
violated the Free Exercise Clause or the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination (he does not expound on the merits of these claims).l57
Schauer contends that the plaintiffs' invocation of the Free Speech Clause
was facilitated by the fact that the act of telling is of necessity an act of speech
in the literal sense.l58 Primarily owing to this wholly fortuitous circumstance,
he argues, litigants strategically turned to the Free Speech Clause as a
constitutional substitute for more germane, if again likely ineffectual,
constitutional claims.159 The Free Speech Clause challenges, Schauer
concludes, were a "second-best fallback position" chosen to "give sympathetic
judges a doctrinal handle and possibly to persuade members of the public as
well as the judiciary of the rightness of the claim." 160 Schauer concludes: "What
had previously been a doctrinally dubious (even if morally powerful) liberty or
equality argument had thus been transformed into a slightly less doctrinally
dubious free-speech argument."l61
That is perhaps the worst face one can put on the DADT free speech cases.
Indeed, as Schauer acknowledges, other scholars have argued that the free
152/d.
153 Jd.

at 183-87 (arguing that free speech challenges to military's exclusion of
homosexuals were "opportunistic" invocations of the First Amendment).
154 ld. at 185.
155 Jd. at 184.
156 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 184-86.
157 Jd. at 185 (discussing alternative constitutional arguments).
158 Jd. at 184.
15 9Jd. at 185.
160 Jd.
161 Jd. at 184.
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speech claims were "more than slightly plausible." 162 One of the more
compelling free speech analyses of these claims was co-authored by Professor
William Eskridge and his colleague at the time, Professor David Cole. 163
Eskridge and Cole argued that the government had clearly imposed a penalty on
gay service members based solely upon their communications ("I am gay") and
expressive acts (including public displays of affection and private sexual
conduct), and had thus discriminated against speech based on its content. 164
Under this regime, gay and lesbian soldiers were essentially forced to pretend
that they were heterosexual. l65 Under the military regulations, they were
prohibited from discussing their own sexual orientation or the subject of gay and
lesbian rights while at work, in the barracks, or even at home. I 66
Eskridge, Cole, and other scholars argue persuasively that gay identity
speech and expressive activities belong within the First Amendment's broad
tradition of protection for sexual expression and political dissent. 167 They also
argue that protection for gay identity speech is consistent with traditional First
Amendment expressive values, that the regulatory justifications invoked by the
government were content-based and failed to meet the appropriate level of
scrutiny, and that by facilitating expressive chill and heckler's vetoes in military
barracks (and elsewhere) the courts were undermining sexual peace and
contributing to sexual neuroses. 168 According to these scholars, the fact that the
government was using gay and lesbian self-identity as the sole evidence of
criminal activity was part of the vice of the content-based regulatory scheme,
not a justification for an exemption under evidentiary precedents.l69
My point is not to fully adjudicate the merits of these constitutional claims,
but rather to emphasize the need for a fair and balanced review of the relative
strength of claims that were available to the litigants and, in particular, the
plausibility of their Free Speech Clause claims. Viewed in light of the governing
doctrines under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Free Exercise
Clause, and Fifth Amendment, it is not clear that these arguments were, as
l62 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 184 n.4l (citing some
of the scholarship defending the invocation ofthe Free Speech Clause in this context).
l63 David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
319 (1994).
164/d. at 321-22.
165 See id.
l66 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under
Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1633, 1644-50 (2004) (providing examples of the
scope of the presumption under the military's policy, including application to conversations
with family members, sessions with chaplains and psychotherapists, and public statements).
l67 See Scott W. Wachs, Slamming the Closet Door Shut: Able, Thomasson and the
Reality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 41 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REv. 309, 320-21 (1996). See
generally Cole & Eskridge, supra note 163 (arguing DADT should be prohibited under the
First Amendment because the government is punishing expression not action).
168 See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 163, at 321-22, 340.
169 Jd. at 337-38.
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Professor Schauer contends, "no different from the free-speech argument."170
Indeed, on close inspection, some of them appear to be quite a bit more dubious.
Thus, instead of choosing free speech arguments owing to their "cultural
salience" or "cultural persuasiveness," litigants could have determined that the
Free Speech Clause offered a stronger argument on the merits.1 71 Moreover, and
importantly, rather than being wholly uninterested in free speech principles and
values, DADT litigants were seeking to enforce them.
In assessing the propriety of litigants' resort to the Free Speech Clause in
the DADT cases, we ought also to consider the political and cultural
environment in which these claims arose. As Professor Eskridge has
demonstrated, Don't Ask, Don't Tell was an aspect of a broad governmental
effort to impose an "apartheid of the closet" in part through restrictions on gay
and lesbian communications. 172 This regime focused on a form of siJencing and
censorship that sought to render LGBT persons legally and politically
invisible. 173 LGBT plaintiffs frequently invoked the Free Speech Clause to
challenge such restrictions. 174 As civil rights era plaintiffs had done, they used
the Free Speech Clause to facilitate their quest for constitutional equality. 175 The
object, in part, was to allow LGBT persons to speak the truth about their sexual
identities-which was at the time, and even to some degree today, a form of
political dissent.176
To be clear, I do not claim that there is no such thing as an "opportunistic"
free speech claim, at least as commentators have defmed or described that term.
My more limited point is that if we are going to use the label, we need to engage
in a holistic and neutral examination of the constitutional claims at issue.

B. Resisting the Activist State
As discussed earlier, commentators have suggested several causes for the
rise in free speech opportunism. 177 Two possible causes that have been largely
overlooked are the activism of the state and the relative paucity of federal
constitutional provisions that limit its powers.
Behind every purportedly "opportunistic" free speech claim is a
governmental action that gave rise to it. Civil rights activists filed Free Speech
Clause challenges to invocations of public order, trespass, and business laws
that were being used to exclude them or chill their activities.178 As discussed,
170 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 185 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 186.
172 See WILLIAM

N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 98-137 (1999) (discussing early cases involving speech, association, and press).
173 See BALL, supra note 125, at 50-122.
174 Jd. at 92-122.

175 Jd.
l76Jd.

177 See,

e.g., supra note 33 and accompanying text.

178 See KALVEN, supra note 126, at 123-{)0.
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these claims were part of a systematic constitutional assault on an oppressive
racial apartheid. 179 Later, when state and local governments purported to
exercise similar authority with regard to where and when LGBT persons could
gather together, hold hands, cross-dress, and otherwise communicate their
sexual orientation, litigants once again turned to the Free Speech Clause to resist
these exercises of purported state police powers.
In the civil rights context, authorities sought to use their regulatory power
over public order, access to public spaces, and exercise of rights to enforce
systems of racial and sexual apartheid. Playing on people's fears of violence,
disorder, and dissent, they relied on traditionally broad police powers to
facilitate an official agenda designed to make certain persons invisible-to the
law as well as to other citizens. 180 States and other governmental authorities
invoked these powers, and the judicial deference that traditionally applied to
them, without regard to constitutional principles of dignity, equality, freedom
of expression, or other fundamental rights.181 The Free Speech Clause was
frequently used as a means of obtaining at least partial relief from these insidious
forms of state activism and governmental opportunism.182
More recently, states have again turned to their police powers to do some
novel and unusual things: to restrict conversations between licensed physicians
and their patients concerning firearms; prohibit specified forms of psychological
talk therapy; mandate ideological disclosures to women seeking abortions;
arrest drivers for flashing their headlights in an attempt to warn others of a speed
trap; ban loud noises from public sports arenas; and punish creators of maps and
charts for publishing inaccurate information. 183 Further, with regard to the
Article's principal example, public restrooms have not always been sexsegregated.184 Only recently have public authorities deigned to police public
restroom use for gender compliance.185
In each of these instances, one may seriously question whether it really is
"fortuitous," as critics of free speech entrepreneurism argue, that some form of
speech or communication is involved. Indeed, the state's dislike or disapproval
of what is being communicated by these actions seems in many cases to be the
179 See

supra note 126 and accompanying text.

180 See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 172, at 98-137; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004).
181 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 172, at 98-137.
182&e id, at 100 ("The image of a neutra11aw provided just about the only way gays
could appeal to an antigay judiciary to protect private gay spaces and the territory of gay
subculture, even if episodically.").
183 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1614--15 (citing these examples);
see Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en bane) (physician-patient conversations about firearms); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds
(Rounds 11), 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (en bane) (abortion-related disclosures).
184 See Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms: Flipping the Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
145, 152-57 (2017) (discussing history of sex-segregated public restrooms).
185 Id at 160-61.
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reason for its invocation of regulatory power. State legislatures might think that
allowing physicians to discuss firearms safety with patients will convince some
of them not to keep frrearms in the home-a bad outcome for a "pro-Second
Amendment" state. 186 Some legislatures may wish to communicate ideological
opposition to abortion rights through mandatory physician disclosures.I87
Others might object to "reparative" talk therapies on the ground that they
communicate antiquated notions of sexual orientation as sexual dysfunction.
Similarly, lawmakers may object that the boy who identifies as a girl, and thus
wants to use the girls' restroom, is conveying something "unnatural" or even
dangerous to schoolchildren or other audiences.
Thus, in addition to the list of factors commentators have identified as
giving rise to what they contend are ever more frequent invocations of the Free
Speech Clause, in areas ranging from sexual morality to regulation of business
practices, we should add the fact of state activism and official opportunism.
Governmental powers are being used, sometimes in novel or innovative ways,
to regulate matters in countless areas of public and private life. The means beihg
invoked are often aimed directly at the communicative nature of the regulated
activity.
Against these forms of state activism, constitutional litigants have a rather
limited menu of federal constitutional protections to choose from (state menus
are generally far more extensive). For most, this menu consists primarily of the
enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause, and a smattering of narrowly
defmed, un-enumerated "privacy" rights. Many of these constitutional rights are
"procedural" in nature, in the sense that they define and constrain the process
by which governments can arrest, try, or punish individuals. What remains,' in
terms of substantive rights that limit the exercise of governmental power, is
quite limited. Some of the substantive limits, such as the Free Exercise Clause
and Equal Protection Clause, have undergone doctrinal limitations that have
further blunted their scope and impact. 188 Others, like the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, are useful but only in
relatively narrow contexts.
In light of the limited menu of rights provisions, and the non-fortuitous fact
that many state actions are indeed responsive to communications to which the
state objects or are designed to communicate a favored state message, we ought
not to be surprised that litigants look to the Free Speech Clause for relief. Rather
than assume that constitutional litigants are freely picking and choosing their
186 See generally Wol/schlaeger, 848 F.3d 1293, 1302---{)3, 1318 (finding state law
prohibiting physicians from discussing firearm possession with patients unconstitutional).
187 See, e.g. , Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) ("The government may use
its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the
woman.").
188See, e.g., Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,878-81 (1990)
(observing that neutral and generally applicable laws are not subject to challenge under the
Free Exercise Clause).
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constitutional weapons, we ought to consider the possibility that the
combination of state activism and limited substantive rights protections may be
significantly influencing the nature of these choices.

C. The Benefits of Free Speech Entrepreneurism
As discussed earlier, commentators have considered the costs that might
be associated with serial strategic invocations of the Free Speech Clause. 189
Some have predicted that misuse or overuse of the Free Speech Clause will
damage its core protections for political speech, warp cultural understandings
of the Free Speech Clause, and negatively affect certain free speech
doctrines.190 Others have predicted far worse, up to and including the demise
of self-govemment.191
We shall have to see which, if any, of these predicted harms will actually
materialize. Purportedly opportunistic free speech claims, some of which have
been actively pursued for decades, do not appear to have led to dire
consequences. In the meantime, we should not overlook the possibility that
strategic, enterprising, or entrepreneurial invocations of the Free Speech Clause
can lead to certain benefits-for both freedom of speech and nonspeech
constitutional rights.
As the civil rights example demonstrates, litigating free speech and other
First Amendment rights raises the profile of constitutional causes that might
otherwise not get much "air time" in American public discourse. The LGBT
experience shows that in free speech litigation, even short-term losses can result
in long-term benefits.192 In the short term, losing the DADT and other cases was
a blow to the LGBT equality movement. However, in the long term, the
movement, like predecessor movements, benefitted significantly from its
association with the Free Speech Clause and free speech arguments.193
When American society associates activists not with demands for "special"
rights or accommodations, but rather with basic free speech rights, their causes
become more mainstream. Free speech litigation, much of it admittedly novel
and strategic, has assisted groups from the Jehovah's Witnesses, to race equality
activists, to LGBT advocates in reaching both public and judicial audiences. 194
Entrepreneurial free speech litigation has propelled and expanded free exercise,
189 See supra Part II.C.
190 See Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1202-06; Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism,
supra note 2, at 193-96.
191 Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REv.
F. 165, 172 n.46 (2015) (noting that the expansion of free speech protections in commercial
speech would make self-governance impossible).
l92 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 187.
193 See, e.g., id. (observing that despite failure of Free Speech Clause arguments
challenging Don't Ask, Don't Tell, in the long term the LGBT equality movement benefitted
from these claims).
194 See id. at 187, 193; supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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equal protection, and other nonspeech constitutional rights. 195 Among other
things, it has created opportunities for actually exercising free speech and other
First Amendment rights in ways that facilitate the recognition of nonspeech
rights.
This sort of dynamic propulsion can take decades, as litigants press free
speech arguments inside and beyond courtrooms. Consider, for example, the
process by which the expressive nature of self-identification-including the
right to be present and accounted for-has been recognized. At first, only a
few Supreme Court justices saw merit in using the Free Speech Clause to
adjudicate such claims in the lunch counter sit-in cases. 196 A few Terms later,
the Court invalidated the breach of peace convictions of five AfricanAmericans who did nothing more than remain, peacefully and quietly, in a
segregated public library reading room after they had been asked to leave.l97
The free speech claim prevailed owing, in part, to the Court's recognition that
the activists' presence was itself an expressive act of resistance to racial
apartheid.198
Similarly, consider the notion that a person's sexual orientation is itself
expressive-indeed, that in some contexts, it constitutes a form of political
dissent. As Professor Nan Hunter has observed, free speech challenges brought
during the 1980s and 1990s by gay and lesbian employees and service members
"complicated the expression-equality dynamic." 199 During this era, judges
simply did not recognize the communicative nature of gay and lesbian selfouting or its relation to equal protection rights.200 At the time, most courts were
not willing to extend free speech coverage and protection to certain forms of
sexual dissent.201 Only as a result of many factors-including social and
political changes brought about, in part, by the LGBT community's free speech
litigation campaign--did courts fmally recognize that sexual identity was a form
of political expression.202 Transgender free speech litigation could lead to the
similar understanding that a person's gender is more than a biologically
verifiable fact-a notation on one's birth certificate. As transgender speech
claims are adjudicated, the relationship between expression and equality rights
could develop along similar lines.
195 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 187.
196See Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(describing sit-ins as a form of speech).
197Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
198 See id.
199Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (1993).
200 See id. ("The idea of identity is more complicated and unstable than either simply
status or conduct. It encompasses explanation and representation of the self.").
201 See id. (describing the protection of sexual speech as a "radical shift in First
Amendment doctrine").
202 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1327, 1398
(2000) ("So long as a minority is truly powerless, the judiciary will not challenge the political
process openly.").
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As these examples show, entrepreneurial free speech litigation and
adjudication helps to inform the scope and substance of equal protection and
other nonspeech rights. In other words, invocation of the Free Speech Clause is
not always an isolated, abstract event. The clause performs critical functions as
it intersects with other constitutional rights. In general, it facilitates rights
discourse and mediates, through a well-established free speech framework,
public debates about nonspeech constitutional rights. The Free Speech Clause
also generally protects the right to communicate about or concerning the
recognition, scope, and exercise of constitutional rights.203 In sum, invoking and
adjudicating free speech claims has contributed to our understanding of the
meaning of other constitutional rights.
Commentators worry that resort to the Free Speech Clause may distort free
speech principles and doctrines. 204 But we should also acknowledge that those
principles and doctrines are, in part, the product of entrepreneurial free speech
litigation. When it is placed in proximity to and interacts with other rights,
including equal protection, the Free Speech Clause is often itself an object of
change.
During the civil rights era, for example, Supreme Court precedents
recognized speakers' and groups' rights to access certain public properties,
established the requirement that government remain neutral with regard to the
content of speech, recognized a right of expressive association (and a right of
privacy in those associations), and announced that the "central meaning" of the
Free Speech Clause is that public debate ought to be "robust, uninhibited, and
wide open."205 These are all central or core elements of our modem free speech
jurisprudence. They are also all products of entrepreneurial, if not
"opportunistic," free speech litigation.
The question, of course, is whether the benefits of strategic free speech
litigation outweigh its costs. We cannot know that without having a better sense
of the likelihood that the costs ascribed to free speech opportunism will actually
materialize. My point is simply that we ought to at least weigh in the balance
the potential benefits from entrepreneurial invocations of the Free Speech
Clause.

D. Refining the "Opportunism " Critique
I have argued that we ought to approach application of the "opportunism"
label with caution. Indeed, throughout the Article I have suggested alternative
203 See generally Timothy Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (2014).

204 See, e.g., Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176 (describing
the divergence of First Amendment theory due to its misuse).
2 05 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 572-73 (1965) (overturning conviction for picketing near a courthouse); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958) (holding thatAiabamaorderrequiring
NAACP to disclose its membership list violated the group's First Amendment right of
association).
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ways of describing free speech claims--e.g., strategic, enterprising,
entrepreneurial. Part of my discomfort with the label stems from the fact that its
criticism seems misdirected. Another difficulty is that the label seems to distract
from the most serious potential cost of the activity being critiqued-the
wholesale substitution of free speech for nonspeech constitutional rights.
The primary target of the "opportunism" critique seems to be lawyers
and litigants, who are the ones purportedly engaged in possible misuses of
the Free Speech C1ause.206 In this sense, the critique is misdirected. As noted
earlier, critics like Professor Schauer readily acknowledge that constitutional
litigation is naturally "opportunistic."207 This partly explains why it is
difficult to condemn any particular invocation of the Free Speech Clause as
an "abuse" or "misuse" of the clause. In addition, as I have argued, it is not
necessarily the case that lawyers and litigants who invoke the Free Speech
Clause do so without any regard to development and enforcement of its
principles and values, as opposed to some external goal. Many civil rights
litigants, including the hypothetical restroom use plaintiff, simultaneously
pursue free speech and nonspeech values. 208 Focusing on litigants also raises
the specter that certain invocations of the Free Speech Clause are worthy of
condemnation or criticism owing to the identity or character of the
plaintiff-strippers, political action committees, and especially big
corporations are all persistent targets. 209 Finally, irrespective of identity, no
plaintiff owes a constitutional or moral duty to the courts or anyone else to
forego resort to a constitutional claim that is facially plausible and could
provide relief.
It seems that the "opportunism" complaint is better directed at free speech
doctrines and theories. Because these things are so capacious and unsettled,
litigants have many more opportunities to test and expand the boundaries and
meanings of"the freedom ofspeech."2lO Taking this analytic perspective, Leslie
Kendrick has suggested that the difficulty may lie in "the nature of speech and
the nature of rules."211 Opportunism and expansionism persist, she argues, in
part because of the simplistic notion that any time words are regulated, the Free
Speech Clause is in play, and the reluctance or inability of courts and scholars
to settle on a rule or guiding principle to cabin the scope of the clause.212
Of course, this dilemma is not unique to the Free Speech Clause. Criminal
defendants frequently argue for broader definitions of "search" or "seizure"

206 See generally Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2.
207 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at .1625.
208 Colker, supra note 184, at 146-52.
209 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 177-87.
210 See Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1211; see also BURTNEUBORNE, MADISON'S MUSIC:
ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (20 15) ("Reading the First Amendment isn't easy.").
211 Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1212.
212 Jd. at 1212-19.
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under the Fourth Amendment.2I3 Second Amendment litigants are presently
arguing for expansive definitions of what constitutes "arms" and what it means
to "keep" and "bear" them. 214 For a few reasons, we may worry more about
coverage in the free speech context. First, with regard to the Free Speech Clause,
we generally lack some of the source materials that are used to constrain or
narrow the language of other provisions. For example, original understandings
of the Free Speech Clause are less readily available and thus of less use in the
free speech context.215 Further, and perhaps more importantly, the ubiquity of
communicative activity (words) combined with the capacious language of the
Free Speech Clause could imperil the pursuit of broad regulatory interests
relating to public health, welfare, and safety.
One answer to these concerns is that we entrust judges with the power and
discretion to interpret coverage in a way that protects freedom of speech without
imperiling the regulatory state. If accurate, reports of the success of free speech
"opportunism" are worrisome indeed. But even if there has been a rise in the
invocation of the Free Speech Clause across different areas of law, we really do
not know, empirically speaking, at what rate or to what degree "opportunistic"
free speech claims are actually succeeding. True, as Professor Kendrick and
others have observed, courts have recognized certain commercial free speech
claims that seem to stretch the Free Speech Clause's coverage and protection.216
However, courts have also rejected many other enterprising free speech claims.
For example, courts have held that the following are not covered and/or
protected speech in certain contexts: "reparative" talk therapy; physicianpatient consultations concerning the possession of firearms; mandatory abortion
disclosures; public nudity; and taking photographs or baking cakes for same-sex
wedding celebrations.2 17 I have argued that there is nothing inherently wrong in
pursuing such claims and may disagree with some of these holdings. Regardless,
they all represent counter-examples of the purported trend.
If history is any guide, civil rights and other litigants will continue to press
the boundaries of the Free Speech Clause. Courts will continue to face
challenges in drawing those boundaries in a manner that preserves free speech
213 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967) (holding that electronic
eavesdropping constitutes a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
214 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (discussing the
Second Amendment defmition of "arms").
215 See NEUBORNE, supra note 210, at 5-7.
216 See Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1207--09; Schauer, Politics and incentives, supra note
2, at 1616-17.
217 See Taub v. City ofS.F., No. 15-16416,2017 WL 2294501, at *1 (9th Cir. May 25,
2017) (upholding public nudity ordinance); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir.
2013) (treating talk therapy as more like conduct than speech); Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds 11), 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (en bane) (upholding
mandatory abortion disclosure law); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 65
(N.M. 201 3) (rejecting wedding photographer's claim thai state anti-discrimination law that
prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation compelled speech).
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rights while permitting governments to exercise their police and other powers.
How things proceed might tum, as Professor Kendrick suggests, on whether
courts and scholars can successfully confront the textual and theoretical
challenges posed by the Free Speech Clause.218
My final point concerning the opportunism/expansionism critique relates to
the relative costs of these two related phenomena. As between the two,
expansionism poses the greater danger. More precisely, a certain kind of
expansionism poses a significant threat to the system of constitutional rights.
Recall that expansionism consists of the colonizing of areas of law or
constitutional text.219 It is one thing to use the Free Speech Clause to
facilitate non speech rights like equal protection. It is quite another to invoke
and adjudicate free speech claims in a manner that results in its supplanting
or subordinating various nonspeech constitutional rights. As scholars have
observed, the Free Speech Clause has already effectively supplanted
neighboring provisions including the Press Clause, the Assembly Clause,
and the Petition Clause.22o In a related phenomenon, litigants and courts have
invoked and adjudicated free speech claims in ways that have partially
supplanted the Free Exercise Clause. 221 In short, the Free Speech Clause has
exhibited a tendency to supplant or subordinate certain constitutional
provisions. Those provisions then become "ancillary" to the Free Speech
Clause, or part of a generalized and nontextual "Free Expression Clause."
We ought to be particularly wary of this particular kind of expansionism.
One reason for concern is that it effectively reduces the already limited number
of independent limits on governmental action. Textual expansionism
undermines the Constitution's pluralistic system of individual rights, which
extends constitutional protection outside and beyond the domain of"expressive"
activity. The primary danger, then, is not that some "opportunistic" free speech
claims will be successful, but that over time invocation and adjudication of those
claims will supplant other constitutional rights. As I have noted, that did not
occur during the civil rights campaigns. Whether it will occur in other areas, or
result from other claims, remains to be seen.

V. CONCLUSION
Critics of free speech "opportunism" decry certain invocations of the Free
Speech Clause. Litigants, particularly but not exclusively commercial ones, who
218 See generally Kendrick, supra note 9.
219 !d. at 1200.
220 See JOHN D. INAZU, LmERTY'S REFUGE: THE FORGOTIEN FREEOOM OF ASSEMBLY 2
(2012); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETlTION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, "OFFENSIVE" PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A
REDRESS OF GRlEVANCES 4-14 (2012); Sonja R. West, First Amendment Neighbors, 66 ALA.
L. REv. 357, 357-59 (2014).
221 See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C.
L. REv. 787, 788-89 (2014).
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reframe what seem to be nonspeech constitutional claims as free speech claims
are being criticized for doing so. Critics argue that using the Free Speech Clause
as a "second-best" basis for relief may harm the clause's core values, diminish
existing doctrinal protections, and lead to its unwarranted expansion.
This Article seeks to shift the focus of the debate somewhat. It uses the
example of a free speech challenge to public restroom use Jaws that restrict
access based on birth gender. Determining whether such a claim is
"opportunistic" is not as simple as it may seem. After careful consideration of
the relative merit of all available alternative claims, the historical and cultural
context, and the tradition of civil rights free speech litigation, I conclude that it
would not be fair or proper to characterize such claims as "opportunistic." That
does not mean I think it preferable to frame the restroom use claim in free
speech terms; only that it ought not to be deemed a "misuse" of the Free Speech
Clause.
The example highlights some of the difficulties with the "opportunism"
label, which I take to have pejorative meaning. Not least among these is the fact
that there is no agreed-upon consensus for what constitutes a proper use, as
opposed to a misuse, of the Free Speech Clause. As well, and as critics readily
concede, we expect constitutional litigants to use any and all available
constitutional claims necessary in order to obtain relief. As the civil rights
experience shows, free speech claims that may appear on their surface to be
"opportunistic" might be better characterized, after careful consideration, as
"enterprising" or "entrepreneurial." These claims are sometimes reactions to
activist and opportunistic states, which are using their broad police powers in
novel and intrusive ways. Finally, as the civil rights example also demonstrates,
free speech resistance can produce benefits both for the freedom of speech and
for nonspeech rights like equal protection and due process.
In short, the "opportunism" label carries a normative judgment that is
sometimes, if not often, difficult to defend. That is not to say that critics'
complaints have no merit, or that there might not be genuine "misuses" of the
Free Speech Clause. In that regard, the genuine target of the opportunism
critique seems not to be particular litigants or claims, but rather the capacious
language of the Free Speech Clause and the inability of courts and scholars to
produce a coherent theory or rule to cabin it. Until that occurs, we ought to
expect free speech entrepreneurs to enter the void and test the boundaries of the
Free Speech Clause. We ought also to expect that they will use the clause as a
means of facilitating, advancing, or perhaps resurrecting nonspeech
constitutional rights. These are not misuses, but rather traditional functions, of
the Free Speech Clause.
As this enterprising litigation occurs, there is one danger or threat that we
ought to watch for and guard against. The Free Speech Clause should not
subordinate or supplant other constitutional rights. In other words, as between
what critics call free speech "opportunism" and what has been referred to as free
speech "expansionism," the latter poses the greater threat to constitutional
liberty. Whatever short-term benefits may accrue to litigants or movements from
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invoking the Free Speech Clause in novel or distinctive ways, in the long run a
"Free Expression Clause" is not an adequate substitute for the Constitution's
collection of individual rights.

